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Abstract
We build a general equilibrium model in which both illegal im-
migration and the size of the informal sector are endogenously de-
termined and interact in a non-trivial way. We show that policy
measures such as tax reduction and detection of informal activities
can be used as substitutes for border enforcement, in order to contrast
illegal immigration. In our framework, a welfare-maximising Gov-
ernment will never choose to drive illegal immigration to zero, but
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1 Introduction
What is largely fueling the underground economy, experts say, is the
nation’s growing ranks of low-wage, illegal immigrants.
(The Wall Street Journal, Classroom edition, April 2005 http://www.
wsjclassroomedition.com/archive/05apr/econ_underground.htm)
For many undocumented immigrants, the underground economy is
the only means of finding a job.
(OECD Observer 219, 1999 http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/
fullstory.php/aid=190)
Illegal immigration is a controversial issue in political debates across
Europe and beyond. Much of the debate focuses on the border-enforcement
measures to control the inflow of illegal migrants. In this paper, we shall
take a different perspective and focus instead on the incentives that make
illegal immigration both attractive to potential immigrants and convenient
for native firms. In particular, we deal with the role played by the shadow
economy in the destination country.
Although it is common belief that illegal immigration and the shadow
economy are somehow linked to each other, the economic literature is sur-
prisingly silent on the theme. There exists a large and growing literature
on the shadow economy (Amaral and Quintin (2006), Dabla-Norris et al.
(2008), Ihrig and Moe (2004), Schneider and Enste (2000), Tanzi (1983) and
Tanzi (1999) among others), which focuses on the main determinants of in-
formality, but by and large neglects the role of illegal immigration. Several
other studies deal with illegal migration (see Borjas (1994), Djajic (1997),
Djajic and Vinogradova (2013), Djajic and Vinogradova (2015), Hazari and
Sgro (2003) among others), but again with no specific focus on its interplay
with the underground economy. Our paper bridges this gap, building a
general equilibrium model of the destination country, in which both il-
legal immigration and the size of the informal sector are endogenously
determined.1
In our model, prospective immigrants react to wage differentials be-
tween the source and the destination country, taking also into account
how their employment opportunities depend on their legal status. In par-
ticular, as a consequence of their status, potential illegal immigrants face a
positive probability of deportation when crossing the border and can only
work in the informal sector in the destination country.
1The closest approach to our work is that by Dell’Aringa and Neri (1987), who study
the effects of an exogenous increase of immigration on the labour market in Italy.
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Firms in the destination country choose between operating in the for-
mal or in the informal sector. This choice depends on the availability of
illegal immigrant workforce, but is also driven by the usual determinants
of informality - such as taxation, differential productivity, detection costs.
In particular, we introduce public expenditure as an input in the produc-
tion function as in Barro (1990), and assume that firms in the informal
sector have only partial access to it. The presence of productive public
expenditures introduce an important trade off in the model. On the one
hand, higher public expenditure needs to be financed through higher taxes,
which pushes firms to operate informally. On the other hand, if too many
firms enter the shadow economy, there will be an erosion of the tax base.
This implies less public expenditures, and therefore less production in the
whole economy.
In this framework, illegal immigration and the size of the informal
sector interact in a non-trivial way. In particular, they may be strategic
complements: the presence of a widespread informal sector can foster ille-
gal immigration, while the presence of many illegal aliens can strengthen
the incentive for firms to go informal.
A major implication of our analysis is that tax reductions and fiscal
controls can both be used as alternatives to border enforcement, if the
Government wants to reduce illegal immigration. Due to the general equi-
librium structure of the model, we can also say something about the relative
effectiveness of the above policy measures. For instance, if informality and
illegal immigration are strategic complements, fiscal controls turn out to be
more effective than border enforcement at reducing illegal immigration.2
Our model also allows for a more general policy analysis, where con-
trasting illegal immigration is not an objective per se, but is instrumental to
maximising social welfare. In particular, we study the welfare-maximising
tax rate under three different specifications of a fairly general social welfare
function: a benchmark function, in which only the utility of legal workers
matters; a ‘xenophobic’ function, in which the relative size of illegal immi-
gration affects social welfare negatively; and an ‘altruistic’ function, where
the utility of illegal aliens is also taken into account. Results show that the
Government will set a higher tax rate in the benchmark case, i.e. when it
focuses exclusively on the welfare of legal workers, than in all the other
cases. In general, our analysis shows that the welfare-maximising level
of informality is different from zero, thus implying a positive quantity of
2In the appendix, we work out a numerical exercise based on an extended version of
the model, in which border enforcement and fiscal controls are both financed out of the
Government budget constraint. In this case, we show that tighter border controls might
even be associated with larger flows of illegal immigration.
3
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.55
illegal immigrants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
present and discuss our model. In Section 3, we develop the policy impli-
cations of our analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
The economy produces only one good. There are two single-firm sectors
in the economy, a formal sector and an informal one, indexed by F and I,
respectively. The Government levies taxes on formal production to provide
a public good G that enters the production function of the two sectors. We
assume that the informal sector does not pay taxes but, because of its status,
cannot fully benefit from public services. Total production is Y = YF + YI.
2.1 Production
Production in the formal sector takes place according to the following
Cobb-Douglas function:
YF = AFGαL1−αF , (1)
where A stands for total factor productivity, G denotes public expenditure
and L is the labour input. The after-tax value of production in the formal
sector is:
JF = (1 − τ)YF, (2)
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate. Taxes are used to finance the production of
the public good, as described by the budget constraint of the Government:
G = τYF. (3)
The informal sector produces according to:
YI = AI(δG)αL1−αI , (4)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) captures the idea that the firm operating informally cannot
have full access to public services (e.g. infrastructures, public subsidies,
etc.). For analytical convenience, we assume that the two sectors have the
same factor shares.
The firm in the shadow economy does not pay taxes. It can, however,
incur in detection by fiscal authorities, which occurs with exogenous prob-
ability λ ∈ (0, 1). Detection implies destruction of the whole production.
Accordingly, the expected value of production in the informal sector is:
JI = (1 − λ)YI. (5)
4
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Notice that λ can also be interpreted as the cost of avoiding detection,
measured as a fraction of output.3
The labour force is made of native and immigrant workers. The latter
can enter the country either legally or illegally. Legal migration results
from a quota decided by the Government. We assume that the quota is
always fulfilled. Accordingly, the number of legal migrants M is
M = qN, (6)
where N stands for the native population, and q ∈ (0, 1) is the quota. Hence,
the total legal workforce P is given by
P = (1 + q)N. (7)
Unlike legal immigrants, illegal immigrants can only be employed by
the informal firm. The number of illegal immigrants is denoted by Z, and
will be endogenously determined by the model.
We assume that legal immigrants and natives – the two components
of the legal labour force – are perfect substitutes in production functions
(1) and (4), while illegal immigrants and the legal labour force are imper-
fect substitutes.4 Accordingly, calling ρ the share of the legal labor force
working in the informal sector, the labour inputs in the two sectors can be
written as
LF = (1 − ρ)P, (8)
and
LI = (ρP)βZ1−β, (9)
respectively.
2.2 Profit maximization
The formal firm chooses labour so as to maximize its after-tax profits:
max
LF
JF − wFLF. (10)
3In the benchmark version of the model, λ is exogenous. We will remove this assump-
tion in the appendix.
4Our formulation conforms to Borjas et al. (2011), who argue in favour of perfect
substitutability between legal immigrants and natives. A recent article by Peri (2011)
finds that the elasticity of substitution between equally-skilled legal immigrants and
natives is very high. For what concerns the degree of substitutability between illegal
immigrants and natives in the informal sector, to the best of our knowledge there is no
empirical evidence upon which we can rely. However, as suggested by Hazari and Sgro
(2003), we feel it is realistic to have less-than-perfect substitutability between legal and
illegal workforce. The Cobb-Douglas formulation in (9) is a convenient way to introduce
this hypothesis in the model.
5
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The first-order condition of problem (10) reads
wF =
∂JF
∂LF
= (1 − τ)(1 − α)AFGαL−αF . (11)
Substituting Equation (3) for G, we obtain
wF = (1 − τ)(1 − α) (AFτα) 11−α , (12)
which does not depend on LF. This is due to the fact that, once the Gov-
ernment budget constraint is taken into account, the formal sector’s tech-
nology becomes linear in labour.5
The firm operating in the informal sector free-rides on the public good.
This implies that JI is not linear in labour anymore. Wages will include not
only the marginal productivity of labour but also the marginal productiv-
ity of public expenditures, which in turn depends on labour in the formal
sector (see Equation (3)). We assume that a share µ of the marginal pro-
ductivity of public expenditures is grasped by legal workers, while (1− µ)
goes to illegal immigrants. Therefore, the wage of legal workers in the
informal sector is
wI =
∂JI
∂(ρP)
+ µ
∂JI
∂G
G
ρP
, (13)
where µ ∈ (1/2, 1) can be interpreted as a measure of the exploitation of
illegal immigrants. By the same token, the wage of illegal workers in the
informal sector is
wZ =
∂JI
∂Z
+ (1 − µ)∂JI
∂G
G
Z
. (14)
2.3 Illegal migration
We assume that in the source country workers are paid an exogenous
constant wage ω < wF. This implies that the quota of legal migrants
chosen by the destination country is always fulfilled. Those workers who
fall outside the quota can still migrate illegally. To do so, they incur in a
fixed migration cost c, and, if caught at the border and deported, they face
a penalty x.6 The probability of being caught at the border is called η.7
5In fact, formal labour contributes to formal production both directly and indirectly
through G. Notice that in the private economy formal workers do not fully internalize
the social effects of public expenditures.
6The deportation penalty x is meant to capture the social stigma or effective punishment
(like jailing, property seizure and the like) in which deported migrants can incur. Besides,
given our simple linear formulation in Equation (15), the introduction of x preserves a
role for the variable η, that would otherwise disappear.
7In the benchmark version of the model, η is exogenous. We will remove this assump-
tion in the appendix.
6
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Accordingly, a prospective illegal migrant will try to access the destination
country as long as
(1 − η)wZ + η(ω − x) − c ≥ ω, (15)
that is, if the expected return from illegal migration exceeds the domestic
wage. We assume that the pool of potential migrants is large enough for
Equation (15) to hold as an equality.
2.4 Equilibrium
In the destination country, legal workers are perfectly mobile across sectors.
The equilibrium condition on wages, wF = wI, thus determines ρ as a
function of Z, that is how the legal labour force is split between the two
sectors depending on the number of illegal immigrants. Since we cannot
get an analytical solution for ρ(Z), we solve wF = wI for Z and call the
solution Z1:
Z1(ρ) = N(1 + q)
(
(1 − α)(1 − τ)AFδ−αρ1−(1−α)β(1 − ρ)−α
AI(1 − λ) [(1 − α)β + αµ]
) 1
(1−α)(1−β)
. (16)
On the other hand, since wZ depends upon the number of legal workers
employed in the informal sector, condition (15) implies that the number of
potential illegal immigrants is in turn influenced by the value of ρ. Indeed,
solving Equation (15) for Z, and noticing that only a fraction (1 − η) of
the potential illegal immigrants will actually reach destination, we get a
second expression of Z as a function of ρ:
Z2(ρ) =
N(1 + q)
 (1 − λ)[1 − ((1 − α)β + αµ)]AI (τAF) α1−α δαρ(1−α)β(1 − ρ)αω + c+ηx1−η

1
α+(1−α)β
.
(17)
It can be checked that while Z1(ρ) is strictly increasing and convex,
Z2(ρ) is concave, increasing from 0 to ρ¯ and decreasing thereafter, where
ρ¯ =
(1 − α)β
α + (1 − α)β. (18)
Equations (16) and (17) form a two-dimension system in Z and ρ, whose
solution is the equilibrium of the model. Proposition 1 proves the existence
and uniqueness of the solution.
7
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Proposition 1 The system formed by Equations (16) and (17) has a unique
solution (ρ∗,Z∗):
ρ∗ =
1
1 + κ
, (19)
Z∗ =
N(1 + q)
(1 + κ)
(
AF(1 − α)(1 − τ)δ−ακ−α
AI(1 − λ)[(1 − α)β + αµ]
) 1
(1−α)(1−β)
, (20)
with
κ−α =
A−βF AI(1 − λ)δατα(1−β)
(1 − τ)(α(1−β)+β)
(
β +
αµ
1 − α
)α(1−β)+β 1 − (1 − α)β − αµω + c+ηx1−η

(1−α)(1−β)
. (21)
Proof
See Appendix. 
We can then claim the following.
Lemma 1 Illegal immigration and the informal sector are strategic complements,
if ρ∗ < ρ¯.
Proof
The result follows from Proposition 1 and the shape of the functions Z1(ρ)
and Z2(ρ). 
Hence, if ρ∗ < ρ¯, the bigger the informal sector, the higher the incentives
for potential migrants to enter the country illegally. Furthermore, the
higher the number of illegal immigrants, the larger the relative return to
informal production.
Whether strategic complementarity arises or not depends on the pa-
rameters of the model. In Equation (18), the value (1 − α)β is the legal
labour share in the informal sector: the higher this share, the higher ρ¯ and
the more likely the case of strategic complementarity. Therefore, countries
in which native workers and legal immigrants contribute substantially to
the informal sector are more likely to be characterised by strategic com-
plementarity. In addition, Proposition 1 implies that there exist threshold
values η¯, λ¯, δ¯ such that ρ∗ < ρ¯, if either η < η¯, or λ < λ¯, or δ < δ¯.
The two alternative cases of strategic complementarity and substi-
tutability are depicted in Figure 1.
2.5 Comparative statics
We now turn to comparative statics, in order to understand how the pa-
rameters of the model affect the equilibrium values of illegal immigration
and the size of the shadow economy.
8
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0 1 Ρ
Z
(a) ρ∗ < ρ¯ : complementarity
0 1 Ρ
Z
(b) ρ∗ > ρ¯ : substitutability
Figure 1: Equilibrium. Z1(ρ) (red-dashed line), Z2(ρ) (blue-solid line).
Proposition 2 Given ρ∗ and Z∗ as specified in Proposition 1,
(i)
∂Z∗
∂λ
< 0 and
∂ρ∗
∂λ
< 0;
(ii)
∂Z∗
∂η
< 0 and
∂ρ∗
∂η
< 0;
(iii)
∂Z∗
∂x
< 0 and
∂ρ∗
∂x
< 0;
∂Z∗
∂c
< 0 and
∂ρ∗
∂c
< 0;
(iv)
∂Z∗
∂q
> 0 and
∂ρ∗
∂q
= 0;
(v)
∂ρ∗
∂τ
> 0 and ∃ τˆ = α (1 + βκ)α + (1 − β)κ
(1 + βκ)α + (α − β)κ > 0, such that
(v.1)
∂Z∗
∂τ
(τˆ) = 0;
(v.2) if τ < τˆ,
∂Z∗
∂τ
> 0;
(v.3) if τ > τˆ,
∂Z∗
∂τ
< 0.
Proof
Computing the partial derivatives of Equations (19) and (20) leads to the
results. 
According to Proposition 2, the equilibrium number of illegal immi-
grants (i) decreases with the detection probability of informal activity, (ii)
9
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decreases with the probability of deportation for illegal migrants, (iii) de-
creases with the penalty associated to unsuccessful migration and with the
fixed cost of migration, (iv) increases with the migration quota. In cases (i)
to (iii), changes in the parameters have the same effect on ρ∗ as they have
on Z∗. In case (iv), instead, the size of the informal sector is unaffected by
variations in the migration quota, since the latter has no bearing on the
relative return to informality.
As far as illegal immigration is concerned, the rationale behind results
(ii) and (iii) of Proposition 2 is straightforward, as all the parameters in-
volved directly affect the decision to migrate. For what concerns point
(i), instead, the negative impact of λ on illegal immigration stems from a
general equilibrium effect: more severe fiscal controls reduce the incentive
for firms to operate informally, thereby reducing the demand for illegal im-
migrants. As far as (iv) is concerned, the positive effect of q on Z depends
on the complementarity between legal and illegal workers in the informal
sector, and the assumption that the number of prospective migrants is infi-
nite. Finally, the effect of τ on Z∗ described in (v) is non-monotonic. On the
one hand, an increase in τ raises the relative return to informal production,
thereby increasing Z∗. On the other hand, changes in τ also entail general
equilibrium effects through variations of G (see Equation (3)). For low
levels of taxation, increases in the tax rate augment the resources available
to the Government for public expenditure. Again, this calls for higher Z∗
because higher public expenditure increases the marginal productivity of
illegal immigrants. However, when the tax rate becomes too high, that
is for τ > τˆ, further increases in taxation lower production in the formal
sector, thereby eroding the tax base, and hence making G decrease. This in
turn decreases the marginal productivity of labour by illegal immigrants,
reducing their incentives to migrate.8
2.6 The size of the shadow economy
The variable ρ measures the relative size of the shadow economy in terms
of labour. If instead we want to measure the underground economy as a
fraction of GDP, the appropriate measure of the relative size of the shadow
economy in our model would be
σ ≡ YI
YF + YI
. (22)
By replacing YI and YF with their values for Z = Z∗ and ρ = ρ∗, the
8Thus, we obtain a sort of migration Laffer curve.
10
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equilibrium value of σ can be simplified into
σ∗ =
1
1 + 1−ρ
∗
ρ∗
(1−λ)[(1−α)β+αµ]
(1−α)(1−τ)
. (23)
Expression (23) implies that ∂σ∗/∂ρ∗ > 0, so that the comparative statics of
σ∗ and ρ∗ are qualitatively the same.
3 Policy
The general equilibrium structure of the model discussed here above allows
us to draw some interesting policy implications. We will first see how
the Government can use alternative instruments in order to regulate the
inflow of (illegal) foreign migrants, and then turn to a more general welfare
analysis.
3.1 Tackling illegal immigration
If the Government just wants to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants,
Proposition 2 implies that it is not constrained to rely on border controls,
but it can also resort to alternative policies, namely lowering taxes and
increasing fiscal controls. In other words, our model suggests that the reach
of fiscal policy goes beyond its traditional domain, and fiscal instruments
can be effectively used as immigration policy tools.
Given this, one may also want to compare the relative effectiveness of
alternative policy instruments. In our setting, border controls affect the
supply of illegal immigration, as Z2(ρ) is a function of η. However, they do
not affect the demand, since Z1(ρ) does not depend on η. For what concerns
fiscal controls, λ affects both demand and supply of illegal immigration, as
it enters in both the expressions for Z1 and Z2 in Equations (16) and (17).
This suggests that fiscal controls may be more effective than border controls
at reducing illegal immigration, as stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 Assume that illegal immigration and the informal sector are
strategic complements (Lemma 1). Then,
(i) if λ ≥ η,
∣∣∣∣∣∂Z∗∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∣∂Z∗∂η
∣∣∣∣∣;
11
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(ii) if λ < η, there exists c¯ =
(1 − η)2ω − [(1 − λ) − η(1 − η)]x
η − λ such that for
c < c¯,
∣∣∣∣∣∂Z∗∂λ
∣∣∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∣∣∂Z∗∂η
∣∣∣∣∣.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 reveals that, under strategic complementarity, increasing
λ may be more effective than increasing η at reducing illegal immigration,
provided that the probability of detecting informal activity in the domestic
economy is higher than the probability of detecting illegal immigrants at
the border, i.e. if λ ≥ η. When λ < η, fiscal controls are still more effective
than border controls, if the cost of migrating illegally is sufficiently low.
The differential effectiveness of the two instruments hinges on two
characteristics of the model. First, as mentioned above, while λ affects
both the incentive for firms to go informal and the incentive to migrate
illegally, η influences only the latter. Second, restricting our attention to
the incentive to migrate, we can see that the effect of λ is negative, while
η has an ambiguous effect. To understand why, consider the incentive to
migrate illegally, as expressed by Equation (15). The higher isλ, the smaller
the marginal productivity of labour in the informal sector. This implies a
lower wZ, and thereby a lower expected reward from illegal immigration.
The effect ofη is twofold. First, a higherη reduces the expected reward from
illegal immigration, by reducing the probability of earning the wage wZ.
Second, as fewer immigrants will actually reach the destination country,
their marginal productivity in the informal sector will be higher, which
goes against the first effect, implying a higher wZ.
As far as the tax rate τ is concerned, its relative effectiveness with
respect to border and fiscal controls is difficult to assess. First, different
from η and λ, the effect of τ on the equilibrium value of illegal immigration
Z∗ in non-monotonic, as stated in Proposition 2. Second, since η and λ
are probabilities, while τ is a tax rate, these two types of variables are
inherently heterogeneous, and therefore not directly comparable.
These results abstract from the possible trade off between alternative
policies. In particular, fiscal and border controls are typically financed out
of the same scarce resources, namely fiscal receipts. Moreover, public funds
can be transformed into the probabilities λ and η according to different
technologies, that are not specified in the current version of the model.9
9In the Appendix, we propose an extended version of the model who gets closer to
reality, by assuming that border control and detection of informal activity are police-
12
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3.2 Welfare
Our discussion so far has stemmed from the hypothesis that the Govern-
ment would like to decrease the number of illegal aliens in the domestic
economy. Although this is arguably what can be inferred from current po-
litical debates, it is hardly a logical implication of the model. Rather than
being an objective in itself, the regulation of illegal immigration should
in fact be instrumental to maximising social welfare. As we shall see be-
low, if public expenditure is productive, the welfare-maximising level of
informality will be different from zero, thus implying a positive quantity
of illegal immigrants. In other words, zero illegal immigration is not likely
to be the chosen outcome of a welfare-maximising Government.10
To study the issue, we assume that the Government maximises the
following welfare function:
Ω =
P
P + ψZ∗
(
w∗F − θ
Z∗
P
)
+
ψZ∗
P + ψZ∗
w∗Z. (24)
In this formulation, the Government values a weighted average of per-
capita consumption by native, legal and illegal immigrants.11 We assume
that the Government gives the same weight to native and legal immigrants
(i.e. 1), whereas it gives a weight ψ ∈ [0, 1] to illegal immigrants. This
parameter can be interpreted as the degree of altruism of voters towards
disenfranchised illegal immigrants. Moreover, we assume that the relative
size of illegal immigration might exert a direct negative effect on the utility
operated, and therefore financed through fiscal recipes. Such a feature introduces a
trade off between border patrolling and detection of informal activity, in the context of
a balanced Government budget. This model could only be solved numerically. Results
from simulations confirm our analytical findings, and even reinforce them. Indeed, quite
paradoxically, a Government enforcing more border patrolling with the intent of reducing
the number of illegal aliens in the country might instead end up having more of them.
This stems from the fact that in the model any increase in border patrolling has the side
effect of reducing detection of informal activities, which in turn increases the returns to
the informal sector, thereby acting as a call for potential immigrants to migrate illegally.
10Our Government differs from a benevolent dictator, concerned with the implemen-
tation of the social optimum. Unlike a full-fledged social planner, the Government here
takes the structure of incentives that determine the market equilibrium as given, without
internalizing the externality due to the presence of the public expenditure G. Accordingly,
we are in a second-best scenario. The underlying assumption that we have made for an-
alytical tractability is that the Government chooses its policy variables by aggregating
individual preferences. This does not impinge on the overall validity of our the analysis,
since the main focus of this article is on illegal immigration and not on optimal taxation
per se.
11Given that in our model there is no capital, maximizing per capita consumption is at
equilibrium tantamount to maximizing wages.
13
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of native voters (xenophobic preferences), through the parameter θ ≥ 0,
which accounts for direct aversion towards illegal immigration.
The description of social welfare in Equation (24) is fairly general, and
yet too complex to allow for the immediate derivation of clear-cut analytical
results. Therefore, we have chosen to decline this social welfare function
into different sub-cases, depending on the values of the parametersθ andψ
that describe the different possible attitudes of the society towards (illegal)
immigration. This will allow us to derive interesting analytical results for
public policy. We shall then come back to the original welfare function and
consider what we have learned.
As a benchmark case we consider a welfare function given by Equation
(24) for θ = 0 and ψ = 0:
Ωb = w∗F = A
1
1−α
F (1 − α)(1 − τ)τ
α
1−α , (25)
where subscript b stand for ‘benchmark’. This formulation is tantamount
to assuming that the Government maximises per capita consumption of
legal workers (natives plus legal immigrants), without taking into account
neither the number nor the consumption of illegal immigrants. The reason
for considering this as the benchmark case is that illegal immigrants do
not have voting rights, and therefore might not enter the objective function
of the Government. This function has three interesting characteristics.
First, Ωb is a hump-shaped function of τ and reaches a maximum at τb =
α. Accordingly, for τ = τb, the welfare maximising number of illegal
immigrants is strictly positive. Second, Ωb does not depend on λ or η.
Third, given τˆ from Proposition 2, i.e. the level of τ below which the
number of illegal immigrants always varies in the same direction as the
tax rate, we can prove that τb is always smaller than τˆ.
Lemma 2 Given τˆ from Proposition 2, if τˆ > 0, then τb < τˆ.
Proof
See Appendix. 
The second declination of our welfare function still ignores consump-
tion by illegal immigrants (i.e. ψ = 0 ), but includes the possibility that
native voters have a negative sentiment against illegal migrants, i.e. θ > 0.
Accordingly, Equation (24) becomes,
Ωx = Ωb − θZ
∗
P
, (26)
where subscript x stands for ‘xenophobic’. It can be noticed that for θ = 0,
Ωx coincides with Ωb.
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By comparing Ωx with Ωb, we have a second policy implication: a
welfare maximising Government who has xenophobic preferences will
set a lower tax rate than a Government who simply disregards illegal
immigrants.12 The following proposition makes the point.
Proposition 4 Be τx the value of τ which maximizes Ωx, then τx ≤ τb .
Proof
See Appendix. 
To understand the rationale behind this result, consider the case of
strategic complementarity.13 The social welfare function Ωx depends neg-
atively on Z∗, which in turn is a positive function of τ (since the incentive
to go informal increases with taxes). Suppose the tax rate is set at the level
that maximizes w∗F. Then, looking at Equations (25) and (26), one can see
that there is room for welfare improvement through a reduction in taxes: a
xenophobic policy maker is willing to trade off a decrease in wages against
a decrease in the number of illegal immigrants.
The third declination of our social welfare function includes no xeno-
phobic component (i.e. we are back to the case θ = 0), but on the con-
trary encompasses the well-being of illegal immigrants. In terms of the
parameters of Equation (24), this translates into the assumption ψ > 0.
Accordingly, the social welfare function becomes
Ωa =
Pw∗F + ψZ
∗w∗Z
P + ψZ∗
, (27)
where subscript a stands for ‘altruistic’. Forψ = 0, Ωa boils down to Ωb. For
ψ = 1, illegal immigrants are given the same weight as all other workers,
a situation we could label as perfect altruism. To ease comparison, we can
rewrite Equation (27) as
Ωa = Ωb − ψZ
∗
P + ψZ∗
(w∗F − w∗Z), (28)
which allows us to claim the following:
Proposition 5 Be τa the value of τ which maximizes Ωa, then τa ≤ τb .
12Therefore, our model provides a rationale for the common observation that xenopho-
bic parties typically advocate lower taxes.
13The result of the proposition is actually more general, as it applies also to the case of
substitutability. See the proof in the Appendix.
15
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2015.55
Proof
See Appendix. 
Hence, introducing altruism towards illegal immigrants implies that
the welfare-maximizing tax rate is again lower than in the benchmark
case. This result is qualitatively the same as Proposition 4. This might
be surprising: Ωx introduces xenophobic preferences, while Ωa allows for
a certain degree of altruism towards illegal immigrants, and yet, in both
cases the welfare-maximising tax rate is lower than in the benchmark case.
To understand the logic of this seemingly puzzling result, consider again
the case of strategic complementarity. Given that Ωa is positively related to
the average wage of illegal immigrants, which is in turn a negative function
of Z∗, the Government prefers fewer, but wealthier illegal immigrants.14
Therefore, it will reduce taxes below τb, so as to decrease the size of the
informal sector, and then discourage illegal immigration.15 The social
welfare functions Ωb, Ωx and Ωa are represented in Figure 2.
As far as the general welfare function Ω is concerned, the analysis of the
three different sub-cases - benchmark, xenophobic and altruistic - allow us
to prove the following.
Proposition 6 There existsτ∗ such that Ω is maximized, andτ∗ ≤ min{τa, τb, τx}.
Proof
See Appendix. 
To grasp the logic behind Proposition 6, consider that – as explained in
Propositions 4 and 5 – the introduction of altruism or xenophobia makes
the welfare-maximizing tax rate decrease with respect to the benchmark
case. A fortiori, when we consider a social welfare function encompassing
both altruism and xenophobia, the welfare-maximizing tax rate will be
lower than the benchmark case.
14The results of Proposition 5 do not rest on the assumption of strategic complementar-
ity. They do depend, however, on the way we have introduced altruism towards illegal
immigrants in Equation (27). Alternative specifications are possible. In particular, the
relevant variable for altruistic natives who consider migration as a poverty-alleviation
device might not be the average wage for illegal immigrants. An altruistic social welfare
function could for instance depend on (i) the difference between the immigrants wage
and what they would have earned, had they never migrated, and/or (ii) the number of
illegal immigrants (if illegal immigration is seen as the only chance of escaping poverty).
In such cases, social welfare needs not depend negatively on Z∗.
15To better understand why both τx and τa are lower than τb, notice that Ωx and Ωa
have a similar structure: both are equal to Ωb minus a positive function of Z∗.
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0 1 Τ
Welfare
Figure 2: Social welfare functions and τ: Ωb (red-solid line), Ωx (blue-
dashed line), Ωa (black-dotted line).
An interesting result of our model is that the number of illegal immi-
grants chosen by a welfare-maximising Government always varies in the
same direction as taxes, independently of the specific welfare function. In-
deed, results from Propositions 4, 5 and 6, coupled with those from Lemma
2 ensure that whenever τˆ is positive, τˆ ≥ max{τa, τb, τx, τ∗}. This implies
that we are always under the case (v.2) of Proposition 2. Therefore, our
model provides an additional rationale explaining why right-wing par-
ties, i.e. parties whose electoral platform leans towards low taxes and
low public expenditures are also typically conservative on immigration
matters.
Beyond taxation, in this model the Government has in principle three
other policy instruments that can influence the number of illegal immi-
grants in the country: the probability of detection at the border η, the
probability of detection of informal activities λ, and the quota of legal mi-
grants. The following proposition summarizes the effects of changes in
these variables on social welfare.
Proposition 7 Given ρ∗ and Z∗ as specified in Proposition 1, given Ω, Ωb, Ωx
and Ωa as specified in Equations (24), (25), (26) and (27), then
(i)
∂Ωb
∂η
= 0,
∂Ωb
∂λ
= 0,
∂Ωb
∂q
= 0;
(ii)
∂Ωx
∂η
> 0,
∂Ωx
∂λ
> 0,
∂Ωx
∂q
= 0;
(iii)
∂Ωa
∂η
> 0,
∂Ωa
∂λ
> 0,
∂Ωa
∂q
= 0;
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(iv)
∂Ω
∂η
> 0,
∂Ω
∂λ
> 0,
∂Ω
∂q
= 0;
Proof
See Appendix. 
These results are in a sense hardly surprising, given the structure of the
model. First, under the assumption that both η and λ are exogenous and
independent of fiscal recipes, border and fiscal controls have no costs for
society. Second, we have just shown here above that introducing xenopho-
bic and/or altruistic attitudes towards illegal aliens will in any case result
in less illegal immigrants. Consequently, stronger border enforcement and
more detection of informal activity will always be welfare enhancing, if the
size of illegal immigration enters the objective of the Government. If in-
stead the relevant social welfare function is Ωb, with the Government being
concerned with the utility of legal workers only, then neither η nor λ will
affect social welfare at all, as clear from Equation (25). Finally, notice that
the legal migration quota q has no effect on social welfare, since in equi-
librium the production function in the formal sector has constant return to
labour, implying that the marginal productivity of labour is independent
of the quantity of labour employed.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have built a general equilibrium model to study the inter-
play between illegal migration and the shadow economy in the destination
country, a topic overlooked by the literature so far. In our framework, the
number of illegal immigrants and the size of the informal sector are en-
dogenously determined and may turn out to be strategic complements:
the bigger the dimension of the shadow economy in the host country,
the stronger the incentive for potential migrants to migrate illegally, and
vice versa. Consequently, traditional determinants of informality (such as
taxation and fiscal controls) can also explain illegal immigration.
This holds interesting policy implications. In particular, we have shown
that, in order to contrast illegal immigration, indirect measures such as
tax reduction and detection of informal activities can be used as substi-
tutes for border enforcement. Furthermore, we have found that a welfare-
maximising Government (i) will never choose to drive illegal immigration
to zero, and (ii) will set the tax rate to a lower value if, rather than just
focusing on the welfare of legal workers, integrates illegal immigration in
its objective function.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
The model equilibria is the set of solutions (ρ∗,Z(ρ∗)) = (ρ∗,Z∗) to equations
(16) and (17). The first equilibrium is (0, 0) since Z1(0) = Z2(0). We prove
next that Z1(ρ) and Z2(ρ) coincide for a value of ρ between 0 and 1. The
limits of equations (16) and (17) when ρ tends to 0 and∞:{
limρ→0 Z1(ρ) = 0,
limρ→∞ Z1(ρ) = ∞.{
limρ→0 Z2(ρ) = 0,
limρ→∞ Z2(ρ) = 0.
On the one hand, since Z2 is a continuous function of ρ, taking the value
0 for ρ = 0 or ρ = 1, we know that Z2 increases first and that it has a
maximum for an interior value of ρ. After the maximum, Z2 decreases to
reach 0 for ρ = 1. On the other hand, Z1 is strictly increasing in ρ. To prove
that Z1 and Z2 cross at an interior value of ρ we show that
lim
ρ→0 Z
′
1(ρ) < limρ→0 Z
′
2(ρ). (29)
Indeed,
Z′1(0) = N(1 + q)
(
(1 − α)(1 − τ)AFδ−α
AI(1 − λ) [(1 − α)β + αµ]
) 1
(1−α)(1−β) α
(1 − α)(1 − β) ,
and
lim
ρ→0 Z
′
2(ρ) =
= lim
ρ→0 N(1 + q)
 (1 − λ)[1 − ((1 − α)β + αµ)]AI (τAF) α1−α δαω + c+ηx1−η

1
α+(1−α)β
×
×
(
(1 − α)β
α + (1 − α)βρ
(1−α)β
α+(1−α)β−1 − α
α + (1 − α)β (1 − ρ)
α
α+(1−α)β−1
)
= ∞.
This finishes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 3
The proposition demonstration is based on Z2(ρ) rather than on Z∗ because
the expression of Z2 is easier to handle. Proving the proposition state-
ments for Z2(ρ), ∀ρ, means that in particular, the statements hold for ρ∗, a
particular value of ρ.
The partial derivatives of Z2 with respect to λ and η:
∂Z2
∂λ =
1
(1−λ)(α(1−β)+β) ,
∂Z2
∂η =
c+x
(1−η)(α(1−β)+β)(c+xη+w(1−η)) .
Whether λ or η have a larger effect on Z2 depends on whether the
changes take place on the semi-plane λ > η or on the semi-plane λ < η:
i) If λ > η, then ∂Z2∂λ >
∂Z2
∂η if
1 >
c + x
c + ηx + w(1 − η) .
Note that since x < w, the inequality above is trivially satisfied. Then,
∂Z2(ρ)
∂λ >
∂Z2(ρ)
∂η for all ρ, so that
∂Z∗
∂λ >
∂Z∗
∂η .
ii) If λ < η, then ∂Z2∂λ >
∂Z2
∂η if
1
1 − λ >
1
1 − η
c + x
c + ηx + w(1 − η) ,
or
c <
w(1 − η)2 + xη(1 − η) − x(1 − λ)
η − λ = c¯.
We conclude that when λ < η, ∂Z
∗
∂λ >
∂Z∗
∂η if and only if c < c¯.
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of lemma is trivial, as it just follows from the direct comparison of
τˆ and τb. However, we need to establish the hypotheses on the parameters
that will make it hold. τˆ > 0 if either α(1 − α) > β, or if α(1 − α) < β,
whenever κ < αβ(1−α)−α .
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Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
In Propositions 4 and 5, the welfare functions Ωx and Ωa are defined as the
difference of two other functions that we call the original functions: Ωx = Ωb − θ
Z∗
P ,
Ωa = Ωb − ψZ∗P+ψZ∗ (w∗F − w∗Z).
These original functions are C2 and concave. To prove Propositions
4 and 5 we show first that the difference of two concave functions has a
unique maximum. Second, we prove that the afore mentioned maximum
lies below the lowest of the maxima of the original functions.
Proposition 8 Given functions f and g, two continuously differentiable and
strictly concave functions defined on [0, 1] such that
1) f (0) = 0, f (1) = 0,
2) g(0) = 0, g(1) = 0,
3) there exists τ˜ ∈ [0, 1] such that f (τ) > g(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, τ˜].
Let us define W as their difference, W = f − g. Since W is the difference of two
concave functions, it has a unique global maximum. Moreover, if τ1 and τ2 denote
the maxima of f and g respectively with τ1 < τ2, then the maximum of W, τ∗,
satisfies τ∗ ≤ τ1.
Proof: We shall prove first that W has a unique interior maximum.
Given that f (τ) > g(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, τ˜] and f (0) = g(0) = 0, it is true that
lim
τ→0 f
′(τ) > lim
τ→0 g
′(τ),
so that limτ→0 W′(τ) > 0. Since W(τ1) < 0 and W is continuous, there exists
τ∗ ∈ [0, τ1] such that W′(τ∗) = 0. Note that since f and g are strictly concave,
W′ changes sign only once in [0, τ1] so that W has a unique maximum, τ∗.
Consequently, W has a unique interior maximum τ∗, with τ∗ < τ1. 
Next, we prove that the couples
(
Ωb, θZ
∗
P
)
and
(
Ωb,
ψZ∗
P+ψZ∗ (w
∗
F − w∗Z)
)
sat-
isfy the Proposition hypothesis.
Regarding Ωb(τ) = A
1
1−α
F (1 − α)(1 − τ)τ
α
1−α , Ωb(0) = Ωb(1) = 0. Then, on
the one hand, g(τ) defined as
g(τ) = θ
Z∗
P
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is such that g(0) = g(1) = 0. On the other hand, defining this time
g(τ) =
ψZ∗
P + ψZ∗
(w∗F − w∗Z),
it is also true that g(0) = g(1) = 0. Hence, Proposition 8 holds for both Ωx
and Ωa, which reach a maximum which lies below τb.
Proof of Proposition 6
The welfare function Ω can be written as
Ω = w∗F − θ
Z∗
P + ψZ∗
− ψZ
∗
P + ψZ∗
(w∗F − w∗Z) = Ω1 −Ω2 −Ω3.
Let us study Ω1, Ω2 and Ω3 to check whether previous results apply:
i) Ω1 is concave in τ, with Ω1(0) = Ω1(1) = 0.
ii) Ω2 is concave in τ since
∂Ω2
∂τ
= θ
P
(P + ψZ∗)2
∂Z∗
∂τ
,
and ∂Z
∗
∂τ is positive and then negative on [0, 1]. Besides, Ω2(0) =
Ω2(1) = 0.
iii) Ω3 is the product of two functions:
ψZ∗
P+ψZ∗ and w
∗
F − w∗Z. The first
function is concave as we have seen in point ii). Concerning the
difference w∗F −w∗Z, we know that w∗F is concave in τwhereas it can be
easily proven that wZ is increasing in τ. Hence, w∗F − w∗Z is concave
and it becomes negative for a value of τ < 1 since limτ→0(w∗F − w∗Z) = 0,limτ→1(w∗F − w∗Z) = −∞.
We can apply Proposition 8 to the difference Ω1 − Ω2 to deduce that the
value of τ, τ∗, which maximizes it is smaller than the values of τ that
maximize Ω1 and Ω2. It can be proven that Ω1 − Ω2 is first concave and
then convex.
Function Ω3 is concave: it increases first and then it decreases continu-
ously, becoming negative at τ3 and tends to −∞ for τ = 1. We make here
another hypothesis : the wage of legal workers is higher than the wage
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of illegal workers in the informal sector (wF > wZ). As a consequence, we
reduce our analysis to the interval [0, τ3]. On this interval, Ω3 is positive,
concave and is zero for τ = 0, τ3.
Summarizing, Ω is the difference of two functions. The first, Ω1 −Ω2,
has a unique interior maximum, τ∗. It is first concave and positive, and then
convex and negative. It takes value 0 for τ = 0, 1. The second, Ω3 is con-
cave. Ω3 dictates focusing our analysis on [0, τ3], interval on which formal
salaries are larger than informal salaries. As a result, applying proposition
8 on [0, τ3], we can ensure that Ω has a unique interior maximum on [0, τ3]
which is lower than τ∗.
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) The proof follows immediately from Equation (25): neither η nor λ
nor q appear in the expression for Ωb.
(ii) Because of point (i), in Equation (26) only Z∗ depends on η . Hence
∂Ωx
∂η =
∂Ωx
∂Z∗
∂Z∗
∂η . From Proposition 2 we know that Z
∗ always decreases
in η. As Ωx is decreasing in Z∗, it follows that ∂Ωx∂η > 0. Using the same
argument, one can prove that ∂Ωx∂λ > 0. To prove that
∂Ωx
∂q = 0 notice
that Equations (7) and (20) imply that the ratio Z∗/P does not depend
on q. Hence ∂Ωx∂q =
∂Ωb
∂q = 0.
(iii) Using the chain rule we can write ∂Ωa∂η =
∂Ωa
∂Z∗
∂Z∗
∂η . Considering Equation
(28), the first partial derivative above reads
∂Ωa
∂Z∗
=
∂
∂Z∗
( −ψ
P
Z∗ + ψ
(w∗F − w∗Z)
)
= (30)
= (w∗F − w∗Z)
∂
∂Z∗
( −ψ
P
Z∗ + ψ
)
+
ψ
P
Z∗ + ψ
∂w∗Z
∂Z∗
.
If w∗F − w∗Z > 0, the first term in Equation (30) is negative, since
∂
∂Z∗
( −ψ
P
Z∗ + ψ
)
= −ψ P/Z
2
(P/Z + ψ)2
< 0.
To obtain the sign of (30), it remains to compute
∂w∗Z
∂Z∗ :
∂w∗Z
∂Z∗
= [(1 − α)(1 − β) − 1][(1 − β) + α(1 − µ)] ·
·(1 − λ)AIδατα(1+α(1−α))Aα(1−α)F LαF
(
ρP
)β(1−α) Z(1−α)(1−β)−2 < 0.
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Therefore, ∂Ωa∂Z∗ < 0. Since by Proposition 2,
∂Z∗
∂η < 0, it follows that
∂Ωa
∂η > 0.
A similar argument holds for ∂Ωa∂λ > 0.
To prove that
∂Ωa
∂q
= 0, consider Equation (28):
Ωa = Ωb − ψZ
∗
P + ψZ∗
(w∗F − w∗Z).
We know that Ωb, w∗F and
ψZ∗
P+ψZ∗ are independent of q. It turns out that
w∗Z is also independent of q:
w∗Z = [(1−β)+α(1−µ)](1−λ)AIδατα(1+α(1−α))Aα(1−α)F LαF
(
ρ∗P
)β(1−α) Z∗(1−α)(1−β)−1.
Indeed, substituting Equations (8), (19) and (20) for LF, ρ∗ and Z∗
respectively, we observe that q disappears from the expression of w∗Z.
(iv) Ω can be rewritten as
Ω = Ωa − θ Z
∗
P + ψZ∗
.
Hence
∂Ω
∂η
=
∂Ωa
∂η
− θ ∂
∂η
(
Z∗
P + ψZ∗
)
=
∂Ωa∂Z∗ − θP(P + ψZ∗)2
 ∂Z∗∂η ≥ 0.
As for the other welfare functions, it is also true that ∂Ω∂q = 0. Regard-
ing the effect of λ on Ω:
∂Ω
∂λ
=
∂Ωa
∂λ
− θ ∂
∂λ
(
Z∗
P + ψZ∗
)
=
∂Ωa
∂λ
− θP(
P + ψZ∗
)2 ∂Z∗∂λ ≥ 0.
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Appendix B
Endogenous λ and η: a numerical exercise
So far, we have assumed that the probability of detection of informal ac-
tivity, λ, and the probability of detection at the border, η, are not intercon-
nected and do not depend on fiscal recipes. Although these assumptions
are obviously not realistic, still they were necessary in order to solve the
model analytically. In this section, we remove these assumptions and run a
numerical exercise with a more general version of the model. The objective
is to see whether the main conclusions from the previous sections hold,
and what new insights, if any, we might get. Results show that the exis-
tence of an additional trade-off between border patrolling and detection of
informal activities enriches significantly the model.
We introduce two main modifications to the benchmark model of Sec-
tion 2. First, we introduce a new variable, the police (C for cops), which
we assume is financed through tax revenues. Therefore, the policy maker
must choose whether to use fiscal recipes to finance public production or
to hire more policemen. Denoting by χ the share of tax revenue assigned
to financing public expenditures, we have
G = χτYF, (31)
C = (1 − χ)τYF. (32)
Second, the policy maker faces another choice, namely how to split the
Police force between border patrolling and detection of informal activities.
We assume that the number of policemen, C, is the main determinant of
both the probability of detection of informal activity, λ, and the probabil-
ity of detection at the border, η. In particular, we assume that both are
increasing and concave functions of the quantity of police employed. In
the simulations, we have specified the following functional forms:
η = B
ξC
1 + ξC
, (33)
λ =
(1 − ξ)C
1 + (1 − ξ)C , (34)
where B is a technological parameter, and ξ is the share of the Police force
allocated to border patrolling.
These modifications make the model not solvable analytically. We
therefore resort to numerical analysis. This implies that we have to assign
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numerical values to the exogenous variables and to the parameters of the
model.16
We normalize the native population to 1.
The parameter α is fixed to 0.25 as in Barro (1990).
The parameter β in the labour aggregator (9) is fixed to 0.5, so that both
legal and illegal workers have the same labour share in the production
function (4).
We assume that TFP in the formal sector, AF, is higher than TFP in the
informal sector, AI. We normalize the latter to 1, and set AF to 2.
We assume that the cost of migration, c, and the return penalty, x, each
amounts to 25% of the wage in the sending country, ω. The latter is kept
low enough to ensure that ω < wF.
We assume that the share of public goods available to the firm in the
informal sector is 0.8.
The share of the marginal productivity of public expenditures in the
informal sector grasped by legal workers, µ, is fixed to 0.5. This implies
we assume there is no ‘exploitation’: legal and illegal workers get the same
share of the marginal productivity of G.
The productivity parameter B is set to 1. That is, we are assuming
that policemen are equally productive in detecting informal activities and
patrolling borders.
The simulation exercise consists in studying how the equilibrium (ρ∗,Z∗)
is affected by variations in the choice variables of the Government, namely
how many resources are assigned to police, (1 − χ), and how many po-
licemen are assigned to border patrolling, ξ. To help the interpretation of
the results, we also report variations in the equilibrium values of η and
λ. We run the simulations for three possible fiscal scenarios: a low-tax
country (τ = 10%), a country with taxes averaging around the Continental
European level (τ = 40%), a high-tax country (τ = 70%). Results from the
simulations are shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5.
As one might have expected, ρ∗ and Z∗ are increasing in χ in all scenar-
ios. The higher the amount of public resources allocated to the production
of the public good, the bigger the dimension of the shadow economy, the
higher the call effect on illegal immigrants.
16Given the illustrative (e.g. qualitative) nature of our exercise, we are not calibrating
the model stricto sensu. Rather, the choice of the values of the parameters is mainly based
on plausibility. Consequently, although some robustness analysis is discussed in the
Appendix, the results of our exercise could not be intended as exhaustive, especially from
a quantitative point view. We claim nonetheless that the main conclusions that we draw
from the simulations in terms of positive analysis and policy choices are robust to a wide
range of values for the parameters.
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Somewhat more surprisingly, ρ∗ and Z∗ are also increasing in ξ in all
scenarios. We have an apparent paradox here: for any given amount of
public resources assigned to the police, the higher the number of policemen
the Government employs to control the border, the higher the resulting
number of illegal immigrants in the country. The rationale for this result is
that there is a trade off between sending policemen to the border or sending
them to detect informal activities. Any increase in border patrolling has
the side effect of reducing detection of informal activities, which in turn
increases the returns to the informal sector. Accordingly, the incentive
compatibility constraint for potential illegal immigrants, Equation (15),
becomes less binding: the economy will end up having a bigger shadow
economy and more illegal immigrants.17This suggests that policies aimed
at reducing illegal immigration should not directly target border control.
How well do these result compare with those obtained in Section 2?
There, we showed that the Government has four effective instruments
to reduce the number of illegal immigrants: the immigration quota, q,
the detection of informal activities, λ, the control of the frontiers, η, and
tax rate, τ. The numerical results for the more general version of the
model here show that once the trade off between η and λ is taken into
account, increases in the resources allocated to border patrolling cannot be
considered an effective way of reducing illegal immigration anymore.
17Notice that this result also depends on two specific assumptions. First, in this model
the Inada conditions always hold. The marginal productivity of labour by illegal immi-
grants goes to infinity as their number approaches to zero. This implies that zero illegal
immigration cannot be a solution of the model. Second, the equations in Formula (33)
imply that while η and λ can both drop to 0, they are instead bounded from above, and
therefore strictly less than 1. Consequently, in this model there cannot be full control by
the State of either illegal immigration or of the shadow economy.
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Figure 3: Simulation of the model in Section 4: τ = 0.1.
Figure 4: Simulation of the model in Section 4: τ = 0.4.
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Figure 5: Simulation of the model in Section 4: τ = 0.7.
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